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Abstract For centuries swidden was an important farming
practice found across the girth of Southeast Asia. Today,
however, these systems are changing and sometimes
disappearing at a pace never before experienced. In order
to explain the demise or transitioning of swidden we need
to understand the rapid and massive changes that have and
are occurring in the political and economic environment in
which these farmers operate. Swidden farming has always
been characterized by change, but since the onset of
modern independent nation states, governments and
markets in Southeast Asia have transformed the terms of
swiddeners’ everyday lives to a degree that is significantly
different from that ever experienced before. In this paper
we identified six factors that have contributed to the demise
or transformation of swidden systems, and support these
arguments with examples from China (Xishuangbanna),
Laos, Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia. These trends
include classifying swiddeners as ethnic minorities within
nation-states, dividing the landscape into forest and perma-
nent agriculture, expansion of forest departments and the rise
of conservation, resettlement, privatization and commoditi-
zation of land and land-based production, and expansion of
market infrastructure and the promotion of industrial
agriculture. In addition we note a growing trend toward a
transition from rural to urban livelihoods and expanding
urban-labor markets.
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Swidden farmers throughout Southeast Asia are rapidly
transforming or abandoning traditional land-use practices
(Padoch et al. 2007). In order to explain the demise of
swidden we need to understand the political and economic
changes that have occurred across the region, affecting the
contexts in which these farmers operate. Of course, change
has always characterized the milieu within which swidd-
eners function, and the intensities and rapidity of change in
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lives were particularly significant during the colonial era
(Wolf 1982; Anderson 1991; Scott 1976; Thongchai 1994).
However, since World War II, swiddeners’ everyday lives
have been transformed to a greater degree. The ways in
which national policies and development practices have
affected swiddeners and swidden cultivation, and the ways
swiddeners have responded or contributed to these political
economic transitions of the last half-century, need to be
understood in the context of broader political–economic
and political–ecological transitions.
We discuss six trends we contend have affected the
practice of swidden agriculture in Southeast Asia and
support these arguments with examples from China
(Xishuangbanna), Laos, Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia
(Fig. 1). These trends include: (1) classifying swiddeners as
ethnic minorities within nation-states; (2) dividing the
landscape into forest and permanent agriculture; (3)
expansion of forest departments and the rise of conserva-
tion; (4) resettlement; (5) privatization and commoditization
of land and land-based production; and (6) expansion of
markets, roads, and other infrastructure and the promotion
of industrial agriculture. In addition we note a growing
trend toward a transition from rural to urban livelihoods and
expanding urban-labor markets. These trends are not
arranged in order of importance.
There are exceptions to the ways in which these large-
scale influences have played out across space and time in
the region—including how and when they have been
resisted, thwarted, or modified—but it is indisputable that
they have caused a decline in the practice of extensive
forms of swidden agriculture. These forces have articulat-
ed with other large-scale processes such as the rise and
integration of policies and practices associated with the
spread of capitalist production and trade, scientific and
bureaucratic land management, government by nation-
states, the involvement of non-government organizations
of many types in environmental governance, and urbani-
Fig. 1 Location of case studies in Southeast Asia
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forestry and conservation for development, the promotion
of large-scale state or corporate-controlled industrial
agriculture (as a means of both resource stabilization and
state accumulation), and other discourses of development
have affected swidden agriculture in a multitude of ways,
sometimes positively for its practitioners, but often to their
detriment.
In this essay, we explain why the practice of swidden
cultivation has been declini n gi nS o u t h e a s tA s i aa n dh o w
states and other international actors have contributed to
this trend. The intent is not to suggest a relentless and
unopposed steamroller of anti-swidden policies and prac-
tices emanating from international and national state
institutions, but rather to suggest that swiddeners in
different nation-states of the region are being affected by
similar policies and forces. When, and under what specific
historical and geographic conditions, these policies and
programs have interacted with other socio-economic and
cultural forces varies. The paper is closely related to the
following article in this special issue by Cramb et al.o n
the implications of the demise and transformation of
swiddening for people’s livelihoods.
Classifying Swiddeners as Ethnic Minorities
Within Nation-States
Since WWII and the rise of nation-states in Southeast Asia
and elsewhere, swiddeners have been classified as ethnic
minorities. Many of the region’s peoples from lowland or
settled agricultural societies control national governments
and constitute ethnic majorities in “national” population
counts. This does not mean that all minorities are
swiddeners, but rather that most swiddeners are minorities.
Examples include Dayaks in Indonesian and Malaysian
provinces of Borneo; Orang Asli in Peninsular Malaysia;
Akha, H’mong, Lisu, Khmu and others in southwest China
and mainland Southeast Asia; and Bataks and Tagbanua in
the Philippines. National scale resettlement programs that
bring lowlanders into swiddeners’ former territories may
also make the latter into minorities in their own regional
homelands.
National-level ethnic minorities are often treated in ways
that make them out to be backward and in need of “help”
from both more modern nation-states and development
projects (e.g., Li 2007, Denton 1997, Tsing 1993, and Dove
1988). In China, Vietnam, and Laos, the official view of
shifting cultivation was influenced by a Marxist/Stalinist
view that swiddening represents a primitive “stage” in a
social evolutionary perspective that associated modes of
production with ethnicity (Jamieson 1991, Rambo 1995,
Sturgeon 2005, Cramb et al. 2009).
As we show in the second half of this paper, national
states have increasingly asserted control over swidden lands
and the people who farm them, often completely or
partially dispossessing the peoples who depend on them.
Only recently, for example, has the Thai government begun
to recognize the citizenship rights of ethnic minorities who
live in upland areas and practice swidden agriculture. Even
today many people are officially assigned “mountain
minority” identity status, under which their movement and
access to government programs and land are restricted.
While such intermediate status provides access to some
social services, all those with less than full citizenship have
no voice or representation in political systems, and are
constantly subject to paying often heavy “transaction costs”
to “stay out of trouble” (Thomas et al. 2008, Sturgeon
2005). Some of the long-standing modes of struggle
between lowland and upland groups, the primitivizing of
upland groups by lowland groups and state agencies, and
the misunderstandings and conflicts over the resources used
by upland groups remain problematic. In many cases, these
beliefs aggravate and animate the policies and practices of
Southeast Asia state actors and corporate entrepreneurs in
areas that once were or still are occupied by swiddeners.
Thailand may be an extreme case, but across the region
official demonization of swidden agriculture is often
conflated with negative assessments of the ethnic minorities
who practice it. The translations of these assessments into
policy documents, laws, practices, and attitudes have
ranged from the tagging of swidden cultivators as “lower
quality people” in Southwest China to “isolated backward
populations” in Indonesia (Li 1999). The use of such terms
and ideas render swidden agriculture not only a primitive
practice, but articulate with the treatment of swidden
cultivators as primitive peoples—a concept that can be
turned to advantage in some cases (Tsing 1999), but
generally works against an understanding of swidden
cultivation on its own terms (Li 1999; Scott 1998).
Division of the Landscape into Forest and Permanent
Agriculture
A second trend related to the political economic margin-
alization of swiddeners is that land policies and laws
governing access to and control of land both limit areas
where swidden agriculture can expand and take away
existing swidden fallows. Many countries in the region
have laws that criminalize swidden cultivation (Peluso and
Vandergeest 2001). Many of these laws have been on the
books for a century or more. In the Philippines the Forest
Regulation of 1873 contained a clause banning caingin (the
term for swidden); and in Indonesia, swidden cultivation
was prohibited by ordinance in 1874 and villagers were
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to extend village agriculture (Potter 2003:3 7 –8, Li
2007:39). In the past many of these laws were not or could
not be enforced. Sometimes local government officials were
sympathetic with swiddeners and did not enforce these
laws, knowing that no viable alternative land-use practices
or alternative income sources existed for them; people had
few other livelihood choices (e.g. De Haan 1929, for South
and East Borneo). Today, with the development of roads
and market infrastructure and the expansion of capitalism
through the farthest reaches of the region, alternatives exist.
New permanent land uses and zonings are insisted upon by
governments, pushing swidden farmers out by laws and
policies that criminalize swidden agriculture and alternative
land-use options; at the same time urban and rural wage-
labor opportunities are pulling swidden farmers—or at least
some members of their households—away from agricultural
livelihoods (Fox 2000; Rigg 2006).
Swiddening is an agroforestry system; it is neither
agriculture nor forestry but a comprehensive landscape
management system that operates on a timescale that
cannot be captured by a snapshot of a forest or field.
Understanding swidden requires a long-term view of the
changing agrarian environment. Different types of field
crops and tree species occupy a single plot of land,
changing over time. The development of professional
forestry and the division of rural landscapes between
“forests” and “agricultural lands” artificially split swidden
landscapes between forest and agriculture institutions
(Agrawal and Sivaramakrishnan 2001). This division
between forests and agricultural lands has worked against
the practice and understanding of swidden (Peluso and
Vandergeest 2001; van Noordwijk et al. 2008). The division
was made generally without serious consideration of what
would or should happen to the largest physical portion of
swidden agroforestry farms—the fallows. With fallows
ranging from heavily managed clusters of economic trees
and food crops to minimally managed secondary forest,
they pose a dilemma to government agencies trying to
classify them as forest “in the making” or agriculture “in
transition”.
Most Southeast Asian national governments do not
recognize swidden fallows as part of the agricultural
landscape but rather classify fallows as forests (perhaps
“degraded”)o r“abandoned” land. Some countries (e.g.,
China, Vietnam) allow private individuals to manage forest
lands (usually as long-term leaseholders rather than private
landowners). Others (e.g., Thailand) do not legally allow
smallholders to own or manage forest land at all or only
minimally. Some countries (e.g.,Vietnam) allow smallholders
to manage land zoned as forests, but revoke this right if
smallholders use the forest for swidden (1991 Forest Law,
Decree 02/CP). The inability legally to access fallows
classified by the state as forests forces farmers to either
illegally reopen their fallow fields or to practice permanent
cultivation. Land laws that restrict the use of land to either
permanent agriculture or forestry also deny swiddeners
the opportunity to take part in decisions about land-use
transformations of these lands.
The Expansion of Forest Departments and the Rise
of Conservation
Related to the division of agrarian environments into forests
and agriculture, the expansion of forest departments and the
rise and expansion of conservation organizations have also
affected swidden cultivation in Southeast Asia. More
territory across the region has been reserved or gazetted
as national or “political” forest since the end of WWII than
ever before, although some parts of the region had large
forestry departments during the colonial period (e.g., Java,
Malaya, Vietnam). Peluso and Vandergeest (2001)s h o w e d
that Java and the Federated Malay States reserved significant
areas of land as state forest during the colonial period in
what are today parts of the countries of Indonesia and
Malaysia. In contrast, colonial-era Sarawak, Siam, and
Kalimantan had minuscule percentages of their land areas
reserved (see also, Potter 2003).
Forestry’s role as a key player in the bureaucracies of new
nation-states was positively influenced by the post WWII
boom in timber demand and the rise of international timber
markets; in some places forestry became one of the most
powerful ministries. In the Philippines, for example, 55% of
the country’s total land area is managed under the authority of
the Forest Management Bureau; in Thailand the Royal Forest
Department today administers 40% of the nation’sl a n da r e a ;
and in Indonesia, approximately 70% of the nation’s land is
under the Ministry of Forestry (Poffenberger 1990:7 –8,
McCarthy 2006). Post-colonialforestmanagementauthorities
in these countries oversaw the massive expansion of national
production and protection forests, the implementation of
fast-growing timber and pulp plantations, development of
industrial forestry policies, and in concert with these new land
uses, the wide-spread criminalization of swidden cultivation
(see, Vandergeest and Peluso 2006; Majid-Cooke 2006;
Ngidang 2002;R o s s2001; Dauvergne 1997).
The incursion of national states into swiddeners’ active
farm plots and forest fallows, and the states’ claims to forests
led to a great deal of degradation as well as controversy over
legal and illegal logging and the conversion of forests to
monoculturally produced estate crops. More importantly, the
blame for degradation was largely directed at swiddeners,
rather than at the loggers and industrial forestry developers
(pulp and paper) who cut, cleared, and degraded the forests
extensively. Scholarly accounts have repeatedly shown that
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swiddeners (Thapa and Weber 1991; Thiesenhausen 1991)
but most national policy-makers and international practi-
tioners have continued to publically blame swiddeners (see
also, cites on fires: Dennis et al. 2005;B r o o k f i e l det al.
1995:172; Rigg 2003:298).
The rise of conservation, particularly after the 1980s,
created new state and international controls on forests (in law
and policy, at least) for conservation and nature preservation.
Again, these ideas were not technically new; there were
protection forests under colonialism in Java and nature
monuments or nature reserves, or even calls for protecting
certain species such as birds of paradise (Boomgaard 2005;
Cribb 1997;G r o v e1995; Peluso 1992). However, two things
have been different since the 1980s.
First, the rise of institutionalized conservation funded by
wealthy, Northern-based interests, benefited from and
contributed incentives to the implementation of authoritarian
national policies in the capitalist economies of Malaysia,
Indonesia, Thailand, and the Philippines, and later, in
transitional economies of Vietnam, China, and Laos. To this
end, for example, national parks were forcibly enacted on
lands that were formerly the swidden fields and fallows of
local people in northern Thailand (e.g., Doi Inthanons, Doi
Suthep), Indonesia (e.g., Kerinci Seblat, Kutai, Gunung
Rinjani, etc.), and Malaysia (e.g., Mount Kinabalu, Mulu,
Loagan Bunut, etc.(see Ngidang 2005; Liam 2005). In the
socialist states of China, Vietnam, and Laos, the top-down
nature of government authority led to conservation gaining
ground in policy and law, where nature reserves and
national parks were imposed (Long et al. 1999). However,
in all of these places, the extreme territorial exclusions
imposed by or desired by “big conservation” interests could
neither be realized in their entirety nor were they entirely
supported by everyone in government, international devel-
opment agencies or local NGOs. In the early years of
conservation’s rise in the region, China, for example, was
reluctant to take away people’s sources of welfare and
implemented different sorts of policies for governing and
limiting access to forests (Sturgeon 2005; Menzies 1994;
Grinspoon 2002). In Laos, Indonesia, and elsewhere the
state often lacked the budget and people necessary to
enforce protected areas on the ground; the task was made
more difficult when members of the military were impli-
cated in the theft of timber and other products from within
protected areas (Obidzinski et al. 2007; McCarthy 2006;
Peluso 1993).
Second, these particular trends were further exacerbated
by the region’s geographies of power alluded to above:
people from lowland-based, wet rice growing societies
tended to rise to government power while minorities in the
uplands were increasingly the sole occupants of areas with
remaining forest cover (Li 1999; Vandergeest 2003; Belsky
2008). Both sets of groups had different but unequal sorts
of power—the former had the power of law, policy, and
states backed by military and police power, the latter the
power of presence in uplands distant from the seats of
government and the related ability in some cases to resist
and contest the claims of the national states and interna-
tional conservationists. The growing ability of the state to
police boundaries and to enforce policies, however, has
made it increasingly difficult for upland swidden farmers to
resist. In a paradoxical manner, as well, the emphasis on
community forestry as a way of protecting upland people’s
rights has had the effect Walker called “arborealization” of
the uplands—an emphasis on tree-growing practices to the
detriment of field agriculture or field cycles in swidden
agriculture (Walker 2004). This affects the capacity of
swidden cultivators to grow their own food as less land is
available for agriculture, and also has effects on internal
differentiation and the livelihoods possible from tree
plantations as farmers able to expand or consolidate land
holdings under trees may acquire even more capital to
expand their landholdings further.
Resettlement
Resettlement is another regional trend affecting the practice
of swidden cultivation. This takes various forms: swiddeners
may be moved out of the uplands (see case study from Laos)
or out of forests or away from international borders. Or,
lowland peoples might be moved into the uplands, into
swiddeners’ territories, as it were (Elmhirst 1999; Uhlig
1984; Vargas 1985; Hardy 2003; Peluso and Vandergeest
2009). The reasons for the latter policies and practices were
varied and related to other trends. Many governments had
long wanted swiddeners to settle down and practice
sedentary agriculture (Wadley 2003; Wadley and Eilenberg
2005; Potter et al. 1995;V a r g a s1985;D o v e1983).
Government agents sometimes claimed that farmers reset-
tled from lowlands could serve as examples to swiddeners,
showing them “how to do settled agriculture.” Of course,
where there is not enough water for irrigation or the soils
are unsuitable, these upland environments cannot support
the kinds of settled agricultural systems one finds in more
fertile and well-watered lowland environments or in hill
areas endowed with deep volcanic soils. Research has
shown, time and again, that many upland environments are
unsuited to repeated annual cultivation of field crops on the
same plots of land (Dennis and Colfer 2006; Chokkalingam
et al. 2005).
A second reason that lowland people have been resettled
in uplands is to relieve poverty and population pressure on
land in densely populated and land-poor lowland parts of
the country. The transmigration projects of Indonesia, the
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encourage agricultural colonization and development in the
Philippines and Thailand are all examples of this form of
national scale “agrarian reform.” As has been amply shown
by the critical literature on transmigration in Indonesia,
these projects often cause more forest to be cut down in a
single swoop than swiddening, whether in the preparation
stage or by the colonists themselves, causing rapid
degradation (Rich 1995; Elmhirst 1999). If projects include
the construction of roads (which most do) there is more
intense (and longer term) degradation associated with roads
than with swidden, including the “following” of logging
roads by second and third waves of swiddeners and
spontaneous migrants (Brookfield et al. 1995). If they do
not include the construction of appropriate roads, trans-
migrants in converted forest areas often fail because they do
not have sufficient access to markets. They are also often in
trouble because they are required to do permanent
agriculture for their food crops in addition to the
cultivation of tree crops in a number of plantation-based
land management systems. As mentioned above, upland
soils are often unsuited to continuous cultivation of field
crops. Thus it was also widely documented in Kalimantan
that transmigrants were often displaced by the very
conditions of their transmigration projects and subse-
quently learned to swidden from local people (Hidayati
1994; Abdullah 1996).
Sometimes resettlement goes “downhill” and swiddeners
are resettled out of upland areas and away from forests and
borders. In such cases, swiddeners may have been
dispossessed because their lands were appropriated by state
agencies for the resettlement of lowland peoples (e.g.,
Indonesia, Philippines). This was a common counter-
insurgency strategy in Malaya, Sarawak, Kalimantan, and
Thailand in the Cold War era of regional insurgencies
(Peluso and Vandergeest 2009; Sioh 2004; Osborne 1965).
The swiddeners may be permitted to move slowly, over a
period of years, which might make it easier for them to
adapt to new circumstances, especially if they are provided
with new land. In some cases, governments or projects set
compensation rates, although people invariably complain
these are extremely low and their land and trees under-
valued. Many times, people never receive compensation
because of corruption at some level of government (Zaman
2002). In the “Grain for Green” program in China, people
were to be compensated for letting their agricultural land
be planted in trees and subsequently moved from the
jurisdiction of agriculture to forestry. However, many
villagers complained they were not compensated for all
or even part of the eight years they were supposed to be,
and they were simply dispossessed of much of their land
while remaining in place (see case on Xishuangbanna
below).
The Privatization and Commoditization of Land
and Land-Based Production
The political–economic marginalization of swiddeners has
been significantly affected by the extension of capitalist
relations and changes in capitalism itself that have driven
the privatization of land and increased the amount of
commercial agriculture and industrial tree-farming by
corporate and government groups, entrepreneurial farmers,
and smallholders. This is perhaps the most basic factor
affecting the availability of land for swidden, particularly
on land that has not been locked up in political forests and
protected areas (e.g., Brookfield et al. 1995; Colchester
et al. 2006; Brown 2003). The ability to formally privatize
land (i.e., not just to enclose it for capitalist production) is a
result of the establishment and implementation of national
laws and policies that recognize and enforce Western-style,
state-authorized, private property rights at the expense of
communal and plural systems of tenure. These laws affect
the recognition of private property ownership and allow
state authority to supersede local authorities.
In Indonesia, for example, the Basic Agrarian Law of
1960 had provisions to recognize customary land rights but
key implementing regulations were left ambiguous. Under
the 1967 Forestry Law, the Forest Department claimed
jurisdiction over a large portion of the nation’s total land
mass and recognized customary land holdings only when
they did not conflict with the department’s objectives and
regulations (Moniaga 1993). The revised Forestry Law, No
41 of 1999, has been equally ambivalent about customary
rights. It ruled that indigenous people could “manage forest
according to the prevailing adat (customary) law” (Chapter
IX, Art.67) and suggested that a Government Regulation
would be issued to clarify the position, but this has not yet
happened. Under the Law, severe sanctions exist against
individuals who burn forests, thus proscribing (though not
preventing) swidden practices [Art. 50 (3) d; Art.78 (4)].
Laws such as these provided Indonesian administrators
with the ability to dispossess people and move them at will.
Li (2007) in her study of Central Sulawesi, Indonesia, cited
one study that found “land allocated to large-scale
plantations was 1.2 million hectares; land allocated to
timber concessions and industrial timber plantations was
2.2 million hectares; land under protected forests and
wildlife reserves was 2.5 million hectares; and land granted
as mining concessions was 1.1 million hectares. Thus the
total ‘state’ land officially allocated was 7 million hectares,
although the total land area in the province is only 6.8
million hectares (Li 2007:99). Stories similar to this have
been told about Indonesian forestry for years (see Manning
1971; Barber and Churchill 1987; Moniaga 1993). In a
similar study of Ratanakiri Province in Cambodia, Butterfield
(1997) found that 130% of the province’s land area has either
310 Hum Ecol (2009) 37:305–322been granted as concessions or placed in protected status.
Conflicting government allocations like these make no
concession to the claims and rights of people living in these
areas long before modern states even existed.
Smallholders are also interested in making private claims
to land. In her narrative of how the swidden lands of
farmers in the hills of Sulawesi became private property, Li
(2007) argues that until the 1970s absolute landlessness was
unknown because farmers without paddy could access
forest land on hillsides to use for swidden. In the 1970s
and ’80s, the Forest Department openly took over this land
and allocated forests to timber corporations for logging, or
designated them conservation areas (or protection forests).
The closing of the local forest frontier created the
conditions for a landless class to emerge. A second phase
arose in the 1990s as upland farmers began to plant cacao
on the land they had previously used for swiddens. By
planting a perennial, long-living tree crop, they effectively
excluded the kin and neighbors who had shared customary
rightstousethislandonaseasonalbasis(seealsoCrambet al.,
this issue). Once farmers planted their former swiddens with
cacao, they treated both the cacao and the land as private,
individual commodities that could be readily sold.
Though new regulations were setting the terms for
private property registration, recognition, and transfer,
many informal arrangements emerged as well. In Sulawesi,
for example, farmers could sell undocumented lands by
arguing that their labor invested in land improvements
created enduring rights. Officials responsible for land
affairs sometimes recognized this principle by issuing an
official letter witnessed and stamped by sub-district heads
(Li 2007). By making these transactions official (though
illegally), district officials effectively acknowledged the
customary rights of the land seller. Villagers in Riau
province could obtain “land certificates” by paying a fee
to both the village head and sub-district chief (Potter and
Badcock 2004). These certificates enabled them to sell their
land to incoming migrants, though both buyers and sellers
recognized that such certificates did not constitute legal
title, and that they could be easily ignored or circumvented
when more powerful claimants appeared. This suggests one
reason for selling land: “insecure tenure increased the
temptation for highlanders to sell their land while they
could, before a more powerful party took it from them” (Li
2007: 104). Stories of such informal or emergent land
markets where none existed previously abound across the
region (e.g., Vandergeest 2003; Menzies 1994).
The socialist countries, China, Vietnam, and Laos,
passed through a period of collectivization. The political
and economic history of these countries of course differs
from those without a socialist history, but they also differ
amongst themselves in the timing and ways in which they
opened their economies to world markets and provided
long-term private usufruct rights to natural resources,
especially land (Xu et al. 2005; Thongmanivong et al.
2005). It is notable that today all these socialist countries
provide stronger private usufruct rights to upland farmers
for agricultural and forest lands than do the capitalist
countries of Thailand, Malaysia, the Philippines, and
Indonesia, though this does not mean that farmers can
legally use these lands for swiddening (Rigg 2003).
Expansion of Market Infrastructure and the Promotion
of Industrial Agriculture
Another effect of the spread of capitalist markets,
institutions, and policies has been the expansion of market
infrastructure and market opportunities and the promotion
of industrial agriculture. State policies have supported
markets and facilitated corporate and large scale private
accumulation of capital through the expansion and
upgrading of road, electricity, and telecommunication
networks, and in providing tax breaks and other subsidies
for investors in capitalist development (Glassman 2006,
Harvey 2003). These changes have played major roles in
the demise of swidden agriculture. Thomas et al. (2008)
suggests that in Thailand the state had two primary
objectives when it developed road networks across lands
occupied by swidden farmers. These were to maintain
national security near its borders with Laos and Myanmar,
and to promote opium crop substitution programs.
Roads, however, begat roads. The development of this
infrastructure facilitated the emergence of smaller roads
and new district or local marketplaces, and subsequently
enabled the sale of more products from and to these
interior areas.
The decline of swidden was not due simply to the
introduction of “cash crops”; swiddeners were not new to
commodity production: they had been collecting, produc-
ing, managing, and selling forest products (e.g., rattan,
damar, and bird’s nests) and growing pepper, gambir, fruit,
coconut and rubber for a century or more. Swidden
declined with the introduction of certain crops and their
production under certain farming regimes. In the so-called
Golden Triangle (Thailand, Laos, and Myanmar) govern-
ment officials and international planners had been (and still
are) concerned about swidden farmers growing opium in
their swidden fields—even though some officials were
players and partners in the opium trade. These concerns led
to the implementation of various opium replacement
policies and programs, beginning in the 1960s and
continuing until today, as discussed in greater detail below.
Despite these challenges, international investment,
expanded markets, and privatization policies have had
another effect on swidden. The insertion into the landscape
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holders and corporate investors is a large and significant
trend in the region. Farmers have been encouraged,
enrolled, or seen opportunities to convert their land to
commercial crops. Industrial agriculture has long-term
effects on the land (see ecology articles in this issue). The
most widely grown commodities include oil palm especial-
ly in Indonesia and Malaysia, industrial rubber in the entire
region; and coffee and tea (particularly in Indonesia,
Vietnam, Thailand, and Southern China).
Much industrial agriculture involves schemes for entre-
preneurs, corporations or governments to gain control of
swidden land. These range from outright dispossession of
swiddeners to supposed “joint ventures” with corporate
agricultural companies that take control of villagers’
customary lands for a period of time as discussed in the
case study from Sarawak below (see also Ngidang 1997,
2002; Majid-Cooke 2003, 2006). The case study from
Xishuangbanna demonstrates an alternative, more positive
outcome of the spread of industrial rubber, where govern-
ment policy enabled local people to transform their lands to
rubber production. Smallholders receive the profits from
their production and have long-term (30 year) renewable
lease rights to their land.
Shifting Rural/Urban Relations and Expanding Urban
Labor Markets
The previous trends have largely entailed either enclosure
or nation-states creating management territorialies, or both.
These processes have frequently resulted in the disposses-
sion of the swiddeners who once farmed those lands, if they
didn’t transform them into commercial growers or commu-
nity foresters. So what happens to the swiddeners who
actually lose access to their land or cannot continue to live
by swidden agriculture alone or in combination with local
off-farm opportunities? Rigg (2005, 2006) has published
critical work showing that for many rural people, agricul-
tural livelihoods are no longer dominant in much of
Southeast Asia, even for people whose primary residences
are in rural areas. His case is made primarily for Thailand
with strong data from Java and parts of the Philippines.
Vandergeest (2003) and Walker (2004) have put forward
similar data showing that upland people, especially in Laos
and Thailand, are literally losing ground. As markets and
physical infrastructures are developed and small-scale
manufacturing, processing, transport and services along
with them, more and more people are finding wage-labor
opportunities in cities, along coasts, in commercial enter-
prises, and even overseas. Some younger generation people
who would have inherited swidden or tree crop plots are
choosing to seek other livelihoods in cities, towns, and other
sites of production. Some are drawn to opportunities to work
overseas, in Taiwan, Hong Kong, or Saudi Arabia. Rigg
(2005) presents some significant statistics on this point.
This movement to wage labor coincides closely with the
displacement of these people and is part of the larger
process of capitalist development of these economies.
Though some work has begun on these shifting rural–
urban relations, it is the least well understood aspect of the
decline of swidden (Vandergeest 2003; Glassman 2006;
Nevins and Peluso 2008).
Swidden Landscapes Changed Through Policy
Initiatives: Some Examples
The second half of this article demonstrates in more detail
some of the ways political–economic processes, policies,
institutions, and practices have changed the former swidden
landscapes of Southeast Asia.
Xishuangbanna, Yunnan, China: Industrial Production
of Rubber
Before the 1949 Chinese Revolution, Xishuangbanna was a
tiny Southeast Asian principality populated largely by Dai,
Akha, Lahu, Jinuo and other groups, all of whom practiced
shifting cultivation. Following 1949, Xishuangbanna was
incorporated into China, and the Chinese central govern-
ment introduced rubber there as a strategic industrial
product on large-scale state farms. None of the minority
people were thought suitable for rubber production.
Accordingly, Han Chinese from elsewhere were moved, in
different waves of resettlement, to Xishuangbanna to staff
the State Rubber Farms. In the mid-1950s, after the Korean
War, the Bureau of Reclamation brought in demobilized
Han soldiers to clear land for rubber. During the Cultural
Revolution, over 100,000 educated youth from cities across
China, all of them Han, were sent to work on State Farms in
Xishuangbanna (Yunnan Province Bureau of Reclamation
2003; Deng 1993). Limiting rubber production to Han
reinforced centuries-old constructs of minority peoples as
inferior to the Han.
From the late 1950s to the early 1980s, minority farmers
in areas not converted to rubber by state farms labored in
agricultural communes, where they continued swidden
agriculture. In the early 1980s, the government dismantled
the communes and distributed agricultural and forest land
to these ethnic minority households. At the same time,
agricultural land was administered under the Ministry of
Agriculture and forest land under the Ministry of Forestry,
dividing the landscape into permanent agriculture and
forests. A related policy change forced farmers to pay for
their own education, health care, and local state services,
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lands. Beginning in the mid-1980s, a series of state
campaigns encouraged farmers to plant rubber on their
land previously used for shifting cultivation.
In 2003, the incentive for planting rubber became even
stronger under a new “Grain for Green” campaign. Grain
for Green was an environmental conservation initiative to
encourage farmers to plant trees on sloping agricultural
land. In Xishuangbanna under Grain for Green, farmers
received grain and cash subsidies for planting rubber trees,
since rubber is classified as a forest species in China. In
2003, the world rubber price began to rise dramatically,
causing farmers to plant even more rubber. As a result, over
the past six years minority farmers have planted rubber in
household woodlots, village forests, and on remaining
sloping land. At elevations of 700 m and higher, rubber
(clonal varieties) has become ubiquitous.
Han resettlement to Xishuangbanna occurred mainly in
relation to the state rubber farms mentioned above. The
prefecture population is now divided almost equally
between Han and an assortment of minority groups. The
skyrocketing price of rubber has enabled some rubber
farmers to expand their land holdings through new kinds of
informal rental and share-cropping arrangements with other
villages and even across the border in Laos. While these
arrangements do not amount to private property in land
(which is still not allowed in China), the speed of
acquisition is driven by production relations that approxi-
mate capitalism in other ways, and which deserve further
research. Interestingly, the state infrastructure that services
the industrial state rubber farms in Xishuangbanna now
helps subsidize the production and marketing efforts of
ethnic minority rubber farmers as well.
Northern Laos: Remaking Forests and Agriculture
Across the border in Northern Laos a different story
unfolded. The region’s landscape had been dominated by
swidden fields and fallow agroforests in the uplands. These
were cultivated by people of Sino-Tibetan, Mon-Khmer and
H’mong-Yao ethno-linguistic origins, regarded as political
‘minorities’, while lowland valleys were occupied by Tai
ethno-linguistic groups that based their livelihoods on
paddy rice production and trade. The economic and
demographic landscape of the region was severely dis-
rupted in the 1960s and 1970s due to the Indochina War.
Political insecurity persisted after 1975 until the mid 1980s,
as the new socialist government encouraged resettlement of
upland ‘minorities’ to the lowlands to directly suppress
political insurgency and to ‘modernize’ agricultural pro-
duction. During the 1980s, State Forestry Enterprises and
the military utilized forests for commercial timber. The
territorial boundaries of these forests, however, remained
ambiguous until the late 1980s, when the first national
forest inventory was carried out by the Department of
Forestry with international assistance. The forest inventory
distinguished forests into “scientific” management categories,
including conservation, and delineated these areas on official
maps.
Throughout the 1990s, the Department of Forestry
developed new policies and legislation to promote conser-
vation, imposing restrictions on upland peoples’ access to
their swidden fields and fallows. Foresters demarcated
protected areas under the National Biodiversity Conserva-
tion Areas Law of 1993 and Forest Law of 1996, and
implemented the National Land and Forest Allocation
(LFA) Policy that established village boundaries. Although
policies such as LFA recognized villagers’ rights to manage
and use forest resources as well as some farmers’ rights to
use land for agriculture, including swidden fields, it placed
a significant emphasis on forest conservation by limiting
the number of plots allocated to a household, and
categorizing most fallow land as different types of
conservation forests—thus prohibiting its re-use as agricul-
tural crop land (Fujita and Phanvilay 2008). At the same
time, development projects directly and indirectly induced
relocations of upland populations during the 1990s by
encouraging them to move to so called “focal sites” where
the government built basic service infrastructure (Vandergeest
2003,B a i r da n dS h o e m a k e r2007).
After 2005 upland minorities in northern Laos were
further affected by a national campaign to eradicate opium
cultivation in swidden fields. The stringent campaign
triggered the exodus of many minority people to lower
elevations (Cohen 2009). Fujita et al.( 2007) documented a
20% decline in the number of Akha villages in a Lao
district bordering China between 1995 and 2005 as villages
were forced to relocate and consolidate. The study also
showed a decline in the total population in the mountainous
regions of the same district by as much as 30% to 50% in
particular sites. Together with new legal restrictions on
swidden agriculture, the strong discouragement of opium
cultivation led many swiddeners to seek alternative means
of livelihood. Many relocated along the new roads and
engaged in commercial agriculture. People lucky enough to
gain access to land planted commercial crops, while others
worked as agricultural wage-laborers.
Throughout the 1990s, the livelihoods of upland people
shifted slowly from subsistence to commercial farming. The
government removed agricultural price regulations, produc-
tion quotas, and agricultural taxes in 1986, allowing
farmers to sell their products. As political tensions with
neighboring countries eased, the Lao government opened
its borders with China and Thailand in 1990, not only
increasing the flow of goods but allowing the construction
and improvement of roads. In northern Laos increased
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followed. These changes opened new economic opportuni-
ties for upland farmers, whose livelihoods were already in
transition.
Planting cash crops such as sugarcane and rubber
allowed farmers with capital (usually pioneer farmers who
first experimented with planting these crops) to make more
claims to land. Small and medium scale Chinese investors
from across the border with family and/or pre-existing
social ties initially encouraged and financed local farmers to
plant cash-crops in northern Laos (i.e., watermelon, chilies,
pumpkin, rice, sugarcane, maize, cassava, rubber etc.). This
allowed some local farmers that already had access to
productive agricultural land to mobilize labor to intensify
land use and produce commercial crops. At the same
time, hoping to put a damper on the opium trade through
China, the Chinese national government started a
program providing loans to Chinese businesses to invest
in opium eradication projects in Laos and Myanmar.
Under this rubric, increased numbers of new larger
Chinese investors supplied Lao farmers with seeds and
inputs for commercial production of sugarcane and
rubber crops. As a result, competition for swidden
and fallow forests intensified, altering not only upland
people’s customary relationship with land and resources,
but challenging the resource management framework
established during the 1990s.
Phanvilay (2009) documented the expansion of rubber in
an Akha village near the Chinese border. The village
developed a Land and Forest Allocation plan in the mid
1990s, which not only distinguished forest and non-forest
boundaries, and defined management rules, but also
recognized farmers’ access to upland swidden and fallow
on a customary basis though limiting farmers to three or
four plots. Although, this did not grant farmers formal land
title to their upland swidden and fallow fields, an informal
land market sprang up in the village. Phanvilay observed
that pioneer farmers whom were the first to plant rubber
capitalized on the more vulnerable economic status of late
adopters by informally buying upland fields claimed by
them. The village committee responsible for implementing
the LFA plan is now under pressure to help poorer
households that sold their upland fields to find land for
rubber production. Yet, under the village LFA, the majority
of the fallow forests are reserved as village conservation
forests, meaning that reallocation of land to poor house-
holds will require further forest clearing. Moreover, in 2007
the Lao military and a private company jointly planted
some 200 ha of rubber within this village’sb o u n d a r i e s ,
thus aggravating the land scarcity problem. This case
demonstrates how swidden fields and fallows have been
privatized in the process of adopting commercial agricul-
ture by individuals, corporations, officials, and others
planting long-term crops such as rubber in the absence
of formal land tenure. This not only indicates the loss of
customary resource management practices, but a failure of
formal resource management institutions to substitute for
those practices and secure long-term access to essential
assets such as land and natural resources for less well-off
farmers.
Northern Thailand: Protected Landscapes and Vulnerable
People
In Northern Thailand, national policy makers have been
concerned for years about land-use and watershed manage-
ment practices in the Ping River basin, a major source of
water for Central Thailand and Bangkok. In the 1960s and
1970s large areas of the basin were set aside as forest
reserves in order to protect forests and watersheds; many of
these were subsequently declared national parks and
wildlife sanctuaries. In the mid-1980s, a national program
was launched to classify all lands in the country according
to their watershed characteristics, which, under the guise of
science, placed new restrictions on the ability of people to
use land for swidden agriculture (Thomas 2005). In
addition to constraints on their land-use practices, legally
precluding swidden agriculture, people living on these
protected lands are not eligible to apply for official land
tenure documents. Most people in midland and highland
zones of Northern Thailand have no official recognition of
their land uses because their land is classified as state forest
land, and/or because use is restricted by protected water-
shed status. Thus land they may have used for decades
cannot be used as collateral for credit, is difficult to defend
against encroachment by outsiders, and cannot be taxed by
local governments.
While at the national level, land use is officially
forbidden or heavily restricted in most upland areas, many
forms of land use (including limited areas of swidden) are
sanctioned and governed by local institutions. Substantial
and growing discrepancies exist between what land uses are
recognized by government institutions operating at different
scales, with more support for forestry on the national scale
and more for commercial agriculture at regional and local
scales.
Since 1969 the Royal Project Foundation (RPF) has
promoted new crops to replace opium in the highlands of
Northern Thailand (Thomas et al. 2008). In the early years
the RPF solicited wide cooperation from government and
non-governmental agencies including foreign donors and
technical assistance agencies. Through these partnerships
RPF conducted on-farm research in new, alternative crops
suitable for the highlands. Most of the crops introduced
were temperate, high-value, capital intensive crops, such as
vegetables (lettuce, strawberry, Japanese pumpkin, zucchini,
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and fruits (avocado, peach, pear, apricot, apple).
Thailand finally passed a Community Forest Bill in
November 2007, after 18 years of drafts and revisions; the
Bill allows people living in forests to participate in forest
management and to support government forestry efforts to
protect forests. Two provisions in the law (articles 25 and
35), however, are viewed by many as depriving communi-
ties of their rights to manage forest and to use resources that
they have been protecting for generations. These articles
exclude from eligibility to community forest rights 20,000
forest-dependent communities living outside protected
areas and prohibit even eligible communities from cutting
any trees in these forests. Some say the CFB thus deprives
rural populations of traditional rights on which their
livelihoods depend (Walker 2004). Forest policies, howev-
er, have often been implemented in a manner where some
illegal land-use practices have been tolerated and in an
environment where off-farm employment opportunities
have been available. Thus local people’s livelihoods have
not deteriorated and in many cases have improved
significantly.
In addition to the policies that constrain farming in
upland watersheds and the citizenship rights of minority
peoples, Thailand has strongly pushed economic develop-
ment policies that are export oriented and emphasize
diversification of the economy away from agriculture into
industrial and service sectors. Thus, while Thailand
remains the largest agricultural economy in the region,
the share of agriculture in its overall economy has
dropped to very low levels (Thomas et al. 2008). Rigg
and Nattapoolwat (2001) suggest that few farmers in
Thailand today rely solely on agriculture to meet their
needs. Rural households are increasingly dividing their time
between farm and nonfarm activities including off-farm
employment opportunities.
Sarawak, Malaysia: From Swiddeners to “Joint Venturers”
The territorialization strategies of the Sarawak state have
been directed primarily at controlling the expansion of
shifting cultivators and reserving forest land for logging
and plantations. In the nineteenth century the Brookes (who
ruled from 1841 to 1941) were at first merely concerned to
prevent the Iban in particular from getting too far away
from government control. Ironwood markers were inserted
to indicate the upriver boundaries of authorized settlement,
but these proved difficult to enforce. By the 1920s and
1930s the Brooke Government was endeavoring to estab-
lish permanent forest reserves, following the example of the
Malayan Forest Service. A major internal report on
Sarawak’s administration condemned “our present policy
of non-interference” and advocated that “legislation should
be introduced to confine the operations of the shifting
farmer to secondary forest.” In addition, “having classified
all forest areas, legislation should then be introduced to
prohibit the felling of virgin forest except for permanent
forms of agriculture” (Le Gros Clark 1935: 31). Following
the report’s recommendations, the total area of forest
reserves was increased from 1.2% of Sarawak’s land area
in 1934 to 5.5% in 1940 (Cramb 2007).
The post-war British Colonial Government (1946–1963)
took sterner action to restrict shifting cultivation, increasing
the area under forest reserves to 24% by 1960 and
introducing a total ban on the felling of primary forest for
shifting cultivation, effectively from the introduction of the
1958 Land Code (though some local administrative
approvals were given to clear primary forest in the
1960s). The Land Code became the hallmark of the colonial
legacy in Sarawak. The Code formalized the concept of
legal pluralism, loosely adhered to during the Brooke
administration, allowing the co-existence of both formal
land rights and customary or traditional land tenure.
Customary rights were recognized under the Code if such
rights could be shown to have been created prior to 1
January 1958. Pre-existing rights could be demonstrated in
various ways. Section 5 (2) of the Code states that
customary rights were created by felling virgin jungle
and occupying the land; planting fruit trees; occupying or
cultivating land; using land for burial or to build a shrine;
using land for right-of-way; and using land in other lawful
methods. Section 5(2) allowed local people to enforce
their own customary rules or adat on customary lands—
lands held in common. These rights, however, were
limited to farming, harvesting, and gathering, and specif-
ically did not include the right of individual private
property in land that could be alienated to whomever.
Land could be transferred to others recognized as
“natives,” a category that excluded Europeans and
Chinese. Natives in lawful occupation of customary land
were declared as licensees of Crown Land (Porter 1967).
In addition, the expansion of swidden agriculture beyond
customary territories was curtailed by the Forest Ordinance
1953, reflecting a systematic legislative effort by the post-war
colonial government of Sarawak to protect forest land for
commercial exploitation.
The Land Code Amendment Bill of 2000, the most
important legislative change since independence, deleted
the cultural component embodied in Section 5(2) of the
Land Code, making the concept of legal pluralism
dysfunctional because once culture (which included
swiddening as a life style) was detached from the Land
Code, native peoples had to provide proof of physical
occupation using legal documents, maps, and other
instruments; this is problematic today since most of the
older or pioneering generations who witnessed pioneering
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to be abandoned land and hence state property. The Land
Code Amendment Bill 2000 allowed the state to free large
areas of fallow farmlands from customary rights in order
to provide land to private sector actors for large-scale oil
palm plantations.
During the military confrontation with Indonesia (1963–
1966) and during the 1966–1975 “Emergency”, the national
government implemented involuntary land resettlement
schemes to improve security and protect longhouse commu-
nities, which were constantly harassed by insurgents. During
this period, a large number of Ibans were relocated in rubber
resettlement schemes administered by the Sarawak Land
Development Board (Ngidang 1996, 2002). The displace-
ment of people from their traditional swiddens to mono-crop
smallholder rubber schemes played an instrumental role in
the discontinuance of swiddening.
In the aftermath of the Kuala Lumpur racial riots of
1969, the government introduced the “New Economic
Policy” in West Malaysia in 1970. The policy was later
extended to the two East Malaysian states, Sarawak and
Sabah, with the intent of “domesticating” shifting cultiva-
tors through diverse agricultural subsidy schemes. The
Department of Agriculture (DOA) provided technical
advisory services and both cash and kind incentives to
support the adoption of new crops such as rubber, pepper,
and cacao. In the 1980s the DOA, with funding from the
World Bank, implemented a National Extension Project that
accelerated the adoption of new agricultural techniques and
crops among farmers throughout Sarawak, intending to
further reduce their dependence on swidden agriculture.
Later, the DOA supported smallholder oil palm cultivation
in selected areas such as Limbang, Niah and Tinjar Districts
(Majid-Cooke et al. 2006).
The forced land resettlement schemes eventually failed.
These were replaced with in situ farm schemes that were
implemented by the Sarawak Land Consolidation and
Rehabilitation Authority (SALCRA), established in 1975.
These in situ schemes were more favorable to longhouse
dwellers because they did not require them to relocate in
order to participate. Farmers could maintain their “traditional”
lifestyles, including swidden agriculture, hunting and
gathering, engaging in off-farm jobs, and growing cash crops
like rubber and pepper, in addition to working on the farm
scheme. However, these schemes were restricted to southern
Sarawak (from Lundu to Saratok), leaving extensive areas for
private and joint-venture land development in the rest of the
state.
In 1982 another land development agency, the Land
Custody and Development Authority (LCDA), estab-
lished a joint venture concept to promote commercial
ventures in the plantation sector. In the 1980s joint
ventures between landowners and the private sector
actors did not materialize because Iban and other Dayak
leaders strongly opposed the scheme fearing that poor
Dayaks might lose their land in unfavorable deals with
private actors. At this time, lucrative timber investment
opportunities distracted many investors. By the turn of
the century, after more than two decades of political
pressure, Iban and other Dayak leaders finally agreed to
the “Joint Venture Concept” for developing large tracts
of native customary land in Sarawak. Under this concept
of land development, native communities are persuaded
to surrender their customary lands to the Land Custody
and Development Authority (LCDA), which acts as
custodian of their land rights. Under the Joint Venture
Concept, fragmented native customary lands in a village
are consolidated into a “land bank.” Once the land bank
is surrendered to the LCDA, it is surveyed as a whole
and given a master title and leased to the Joint Venture
Company for 60 years. The equity in the JV Company is
distributed among three partners: 60% held by the
private investor, 30% by landowners, and 10% allocated
to LCDA. These schemes totally replace swidden fallows
with oil palm plantations (Cramb 2007). Unfortunately,
this unique land reform, which would purportedly make
landowners rich, has disempowered them and empowered
the private sector instead; and the economic results to date
have been disappointing.
Swidden and the Drivers of Change in Indonesia
Among Indonesian foresters, and many Dutch foresters
before them, especially in the Java-centered Forest Depart-
ment, swiddening was considered to be “robber farming.”
To foresters, swiddeners damaged forests, although under
colonialism the dipterocarp forests growing on Sumatra and
the Indonesian provinces of Borneo known today as
Kalimantan were not yet valued for their timber. More
important was land control: the infamous ‘Domeinverklaring’
or ‘Domain Declaration’, which came into law in Java in
1870, was aimed at separating out the land under permanent
crops from “waste land,” the latter a category that included
secondary forests and swidden fallows. If land was not
cultivated with field crops for a period longer than three
years, it was considered “abandoned” by government
officials. By colonial agrarian law, such waste lands could
be resumed by the state and re-allocated to European
plantation enterprises under long lease. The accompanying
law banning swidden was passed for Java in 1874. In general,
the blame for upland forest loss was attributed entirely to
swidden cultivation and a force of forest police was dedicated
to eliminating it in Java.
Neither the Domain Declaration nor any restriction on
swidden was applied immediately to the Outer Islands,
but came into force at varying times. It was introduced
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other plantations could be tried. Because there was not
yet much of a formally reserved “political forest” in
Kalimantan, the main “problem” with swidden from a
state point of view was its potential interference with
commercial agriculture.
Swiddeners were not stigmatized until the authoritarian
and Java-centric rule of second President Suharto (1966–
1998). While the Suharto government represented many
peoples in the archipelago as culturally inferior, special
opprobrium was reserved for those described as suku-suku
terasing or “isolated tribes.” Such people were usually
animists, living in remote localities, and either swiddeners
or hunter–gatherers. Larger national minorities, such as
many of the Dayak groups in West Kalimantan, were
Christian, but government officials and official discourse
still treated them as backward.
As in Dutch times, swiddening was mainly criticized
because of its extensive nature. Under Suharto, the
government, through its 1967 Forestry Regulation and later
reinforced by its forest land-use categories (production
forest, protection forest, parks and reserves), claimed large
portions of Indonesia’s land for forests and forest planta-
tions. Production forest land was leased to corporations for
logging and timber or pulp plantations. Plantations, such as
rubber, cocoa, or oil palm, and settlements of transmigrants
and others were restricted to “conversion forests” or lands
under “other uses,” both of which also included swiddens.
Land-use categories did not consider pre-existing
settlements. The World Bank (2007) estimated that 50–
60 million people lived in ‘forest’ areas. During the
Suharto era, attempts were made to evict people from both
protection forests and national parks, while villages falling
within production forest were pressured to give up
swiddening. The project described briefly below, to
convert remote villages from swidden to wet rice
cultivation was typical of the 1990s. Most such “con-
versions” received temporary financial assistance with the
inevitable result that the conversion failed after the
assistance was withdrawn.
Following the fall of Suharto in 1998 and decentralization
in 2001, less restrictive policies have gradually been applied,
although secure tenure, in the form of long leases, has only
recently become available for villagers in production forests,
provided they plant trees (Law 6 of 2007). The production
forest/convertible forest boundary has always been con-
tested, especially as many “production forests” no longer
have tree cover. Such lands have sometimes been reclassi-
fied by the Minister of Forestry to allow oil palm
production, while decentralized districts have included
them as “agricultural” in their own land-use plans. In
provinces such as Central Kalimantan, where there was
little convertible forest on initial maps, large areas have
now been released from the “forest” category to make way
for oil palm.
In West Kalimantan, land along the Kapuas River is
classified as “other uses,” which means that it has long been
recognized as agricultural. In this area, where the oil palm
industry in Kalimantan began in 1975, companies seeking
land for plantations must negotiate with Dayak villagers.
Villagers manage complex agroforestry systems of com-
munal fruit gardens and rubber groves, often with commu-
nal forest, wet and dry swiddens, and occasionally irrigated
wet rice. In Central Kalimantan, on the other hand, where
population pressure is lower, plantations have often gained
direct access to degraded forests and negotiations between
plantations and local people have been slow to develop.
Even now, many estates rely on Javanese transmigrants or
contractlaborerstoprovide their workers.CentralKalimantan
has recently eclipsed West Kalimantan as the leading oil palm
grower in Kalimantan.
1
The two case studies described below form an interesting
contrast. Oil palm development is not expected in the near
future in remote Tanjung Paku, Central Kalimantan, far to
the north of the oil palm belt, where swiddening is an
appropriate form of agriculture and likely to continue,
despite official disapproval. In the Sanggau area, in West
Kalimantan, oil palm plantations are extensive and farmers
struggle to find compromises between their swiddening
tradition and the new commercial systems.
Farmers in Tanjung Paku, a village located in Central
Kalimantan near the West Kalimantan border, practiced
swidden agriculture within a production forest until a
timber concession arrived in 1990. Under the government’s
Village Forestry Development program, the timber conces-
sion launched programs to extend irrigated rice fields, tree
plantations, fish ponds, and vegetable gardens to the
village. With new opportunities to earn cash income,
farmers slowly left their traditional swidden systems, and
gradually reduced the size of their plots. At first the fact
that farmers cleared less land for swidden meant that the
amount of land in forest fallow increased. Unfortunately,
however, the program only worked as long as the timber
concession provided farmers with subsidies to grow
irrigated rice, using expensive fertilizer and other inputs.
After the subsidy was reduced farmers reversed the process,
began to leave their irrigated rice fields, and move back into
traditional swiddening. In 2004, about 59 out of 95
households practiced shifting cultivation in secondary
forests.
1 Official figures for 2006 are: West Kalimantan: 492,112 ha; Central
Kalimantan 571,874 ha; South Kalimantan 243,451 ha and East
Kalimantan 237,765 ha (Direktorat Jenderal Perkebunan (2007)
Jakarta). Areas under the crop expanded further in 2007–2008 as a
result of high prices, but these have fallen since November 2008.
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oil palm in Kalimantan. In 1975 the Governor suggested oil
palm plantations be introduced to utilize ‘sleeping’ swidden
fallows especially where Imperata grass or erosion were
visible (Perusahaan Negara Perkebunan VII 1984:15). In
1979, a Sumatra-based government plantation company
started the Sanggau Project on the Kapuas River by
bulldozing Dayak rubber gardens and tembawang (fruit)
groves. Labor was partly local, mainly transmigrant, but
there were initially no smallholders. In 1982, the World
Bank financed a ‘nucleus estate and smallholder scheme in
which an estate core, surrounded by mainly local small-
holders, was established. Potter and Lee (1998:25) discov-
ered that Dayak smallholders were still actively maintaining
their swiddens and rubber gardens and diverting fertilizer
from the oil palm (which had declined in production) to
their rice fields. By making their swidden field their main
priority, farmers sacrificed higher oil palm yields to the
need for subsistence rice and social demands for rice wine.
Oil palm had become just another element in their extensive
livelihood system.
During the 1990s private companies began setting up oil
palm estates in the district. PT Sime Indo Agro (SIA)
(owned by the Malaysian conglomerate Sime Darby
Berhad) asked farmers to provide 7.5 ha of land: 5 for the
estate, 2 to be returned to the farmer planted in oil palm,
and 0.5 ha for infrastructure. Communities were initially
reluctant but they were pressured by government officers
and village headmen, all rumored to have received pay-
ments from the company. Although they possessed assets in
the form of reasonably large landholdings, averaging 15 ha,
under the new arrangements farmers’ access to land,
especially swidden land, was considerably reduced.
In 2002 Potter and Badcock studied five hamlets (dusun)
targeted by PT SIA and Potter briefly re-visited the area in
February 2007. In 2002, prior to the release of their
smallholdings, farmers worked as estate laborers. Rubber
prices were low and farmers were willing to convert old
rubber land into oil palm; they also appreciated the wages
paid by PT SIA. However, they continued to grow upland
rice and they also wanted to preserve their communal fruit
orchards (tembawang) (Potter and Badcock 2007).
In one hamlet villagers readily allotted half their land,
covered in Imperata grass, to oil palm on which they
worked communally. They were able to retain the rest of
their land under traditional management, including swiddens
and a communal forest. A strong customary (adat) chief
refused to allow the tembawangs to be cleared. In a second
hamlet the headman enthusiastically embraced oil palm; with
the exception of four families, other villagers joined him in
this venture. However, the price was unexpectedly high as
rats from the newly cleared fields decimated rice crops and
yields decreased every year. Although it was no longer
economical to plant rice, people continued to do so for
cultural reasons. By 2007 the rat problem had abated and
villagers were again able to harvest their sticky rice (padi
pulut) for rice wine, an important indicator of wealth and
status, although they were no longer self-sufficient in
food. All participating households worked through a
cooperative that recorded the amounts of land contributed.
In 2002 only 30% could provide the full 7.5 ha to the
company.
Farmers in these hamlets are designing, by intention or
default, a modified multi-cropping system with oil palm
largely replacing traditional ‘jungle’ rubber, but with some
upland rice and areas of tembawang being allowed to
remain. Although there were complaints about PT SIA’s
initial acquisition of village land, many now see oil palm as
a useful contributor to the local economy. While the idea of
the swidden still resonates as a symbol of Dayak identity,
an idea strongly held by some traditional leaders and local
NGOs (Petebang and Bider 2001), sufficient land for large
swidden fields no longer exists.
Conclusions
For centuries, swidden cultivation was an important farming
practice found across the girth of Southeast Asia. Today,
however, these systems are changing and sometimes
disappearing at a pace never before experienced. Swiddening
has always been characterized by change, but since the onset
of modern independent nation states, government policy and
the expansion of capitalism in new forms have transformed
the landscape and swidden practices through mechanisms
that are different in the extent and depth of their landscape
effects than ever before. In this paper we identified six
causes of the demise and transformation of swidden systems,
and augmented this general argument with examples from
across the region.
Some of the struggles between lowland and upland
groups and their conflicts over upland resources have been
aggravated with the construction of nation-states and the
resultant change in the status of upland groups as ethnic
minorities, in relation to nation-state political configurations.
As minorities, many swiddeners’ land and resource manage-
ment practices are misunderstood. Some are thus denied
ownership and land-use rights.
Second, swiddening has been ill served by the division
of the landscape into forest and agricultural sectors.
Swiddening is an extensive agroforestry system; a coher-
ent system of land use that has been falsely split between
forest and agricultural jurisdictions. In part this divided
management authority between forest and agricultural
departments derives from understandings of agriculture
more suited to lowland areas and temperate climates.
318 Hum Ecol (2009) 37:305–322Claims to land by forestry departments and the transfer of
ownership and land-use rights to logging companies and
commercial plantations have prompted major changes,
usually detrimental to the practice of swiddening with its
difficult-to-categorize fallows.
The expansion of forest departments and the rise of
conservation have further affected national policies on
swidden. In terms of territory, postcolonial Southeast Asian
states have reserved or gazetted more territory as forest
since their inception than at any time before in history.
Forestry departments have become crucial and powerful,
well-funded players in state bureaucracies. The rise of
international corporate conservation after 1980 further
cemented state legal controls over forests; in policy at least
created new state and international controls on forests for
conservation and nature preservation.
Swiddenershave alsobeenresettledoutofuplandareasand
away from forests and borders, displaced and dispossessed of
their lands by state land expropriation. This can occur over a
periodofyearssometimesandatothersithasoccurredquickly
and coercively. The fact remains, however, that neither their
territorial claims as groups, where these are still extant, nor
theirindividualandextendedfamilylandrights,arerecognized
or compensated fairly by the governments moving them.
These instances of state territorialization and zoning of
land out of the legal reach of swiddeners have been
accompanied by new forms of capitalist land and resource
enclosure. Capitalist markets and practices have extended
into Vietnam, Laos, and China, and taken new forms,
leading to major dispossessions of swiddeners as in
Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand. The marginalization of
swiddeners has been affected by the extension of capitalist
relations and changes in capitalism itself that have driven the
privatization of land and the rise of mono-cultural commod-
ity production, both by small or medium landholders and
corporate plantations growing agricultural or forest tree
crops. Modern nation states have purposely established and
implemented national laws and policies that recognize and
enforce Western-style, state-authorized, private property
rights at the expense of communal or other traditional
systems. These laws affect the ways private ownership is
recognized and allow state authority to supersede local
authority and communal management of natural resources.
Commoditization of the landscape and its products has led
to further expansion of infrastructure and labor markets for on
and off-farm work, accelerating the demise of swidden
agriculture. Across the region state policies have driven the
expansion and upgrading of road, electricity, and telecommu-
nicationnetworks,factorscriticalforenablingthe emergenceof
market production opportunities. The major commodities
including oil palm, rubber, tea, and coffee now occupy a large
percentage of the national land base in many countries,
produced in industrial agricultural estates.
National policies and global processes over the last half
century have thus significantly affected the practice of
swidden agriculture across Southeast Asia. Most swiddeners
were formerly peripheral to state power and represented by
national decision makers as ”backward” people over whom
states needed to exert control. Their lands and many of these
previously remote areas are now sites of exchange, com-
merce, and trade, not to mention subject to new property
rights. We are seeing a partial but important shift from
directed and even coerced land-use change to drive larger
social and political projects, to land-use change now being
driven by larger political–economic forces. These new
opportunities are overlaid on a physical, social and political
landscape shaped by 50 years of intensive state building,
development and expansion across the region. The end result
of all these changes is that the conditions necessary for
swiddening, both the availability of land and the aspirations
of people, simply no longer exist in many parts of Southeast
Asia. The traditional agrarian question about the impact of
capitalism on agriculture is thus alive and well in the
uplands and other parts of Southeast Asia where swidden
agriculture was or still is being carried out. This article has
made a modest attempt to begin unpacking the roles of
policies and political economic change in these agrarian
transformations.
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